THE WEAPON OF PEACE

BY

SAMUEL WESLEY LONG

"The next thing is to think long and think hard as to how, when this strife ends, a recurrence of such a calamity can be prevented."

—*Viscount James Bryce*



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SAMUEL WESLEY LONG

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THE AUTHOR

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PREFACE

IN any discussion of or plan for world-wide and permanent peace, one may start with the fundamental premise that civilized nations desire, above all other things, PEACE. Certainly this is true with reference to the people. With a few possible exceptions, it is also true of governments.

The real problem of the preservation of peace is a question of means. This, in turn, is a matter of external force—moral in ordinary cases; physical in extreme instances, though not necessarily destructive to life and property.

The writer does not believe that the world has sufficiently advanced toward the Utopian goal to warrant the United States in scrapping its warships, dismantling its forts or ceasing to teach the art of war, rather, the stronger the means of national defense the more respect will be shown our leadership in bringing about the desired end.

If The Weapon of Peace shall be nothing more than a guide post on the road to universal international amity, the book needs no other justification.

It remains for the economist and statesman to devise methods for the practical application of the plan outlined.

SAMUEL WESLEY LONG.

WILMINGTON, DEL., November 1, 1914.

CHAPTER I

Finding the Germ

AT a future date well may some commentator write: "The war of the world ended in 19—.

"Spent and wasted; exhausted in body and spirit, with that slow but ultimate and infallible perception of the mass as a whole, the remnants of the herd that had escaped the slaughter knew the truth —the whole truth.

"The appalling carnage, the empty victory, the colossal debt, the crushing burden of taxation brought even the common people to a frightful realization of the whole sordid affair. As usual, men saw in retrospect what they had not seen in prospect. The basic answer to the cause,

progress and termination of the conflict was clear—selfishness, greed—in the tangible, the concrete, GOLD."

Let us get straight on this point—our writer is not dealing with the anterior or immediate causes of the great war, nor is he covering all the reasons why all the nations engaged entered the conflict, but the stated cause is fundamental in the last analysis.

It is safe to say that in most wars—on one side or the other—the basic cause is desire, necessary or wanton, for gain. To use the figure, lust of gain is the fuel that feeds the flames of war regardless of what serves as the match to start the conflagration.

The solution of the problem of most war prevention will ultimately be found in the field of war's greatest cause—ECONOMICS.

Further, it might be well to state that

the suggestions offered throughout this volume are not intended as a cure-all for every cause of war. On the other hand, if we accept the statement of Loria, the Italian economist, to the effect that out of 286 wars, economic causes were responsible in 258 cases, having isolated the germ of the most frequent causes of conflict we may hope to destroy it or, at least, control it in great degree when we find it threateningly active in the body politic.

CHAPTER II

The Economic Waste of War

NOTWITHSTANDING the tremendous saving that would be effected in time of peace by the abandonment of all military preparation for possible war, disarmament, for the present, is beyond practicability, even sanity, and while the beating of spears into plowshares may some day become general, preparations for defensive contingency can safely be decreased only in proportion to the progress made in the discovery and development of substitute means for warfare.

A telling argument, from an economic standpoint, against the waste of war is in the figures covering the cost of past wars; the preparations made for the present war

by countries now engaged; the estimated cost of the prosecution of the conflict; the money spent and being spent for war preparations by nations not at present embroiled.

While markedly incomplete, the statistics that follow furnish food for profound thought. During 1911, England expended $341,820,000; Russia, $319,770,000; Germany, $318,446,000; France, $270,918,000. These sums were for the armies and navies of the countries named. At the beginning of 1914 the annual expenditures of the Powers for past and prospective wars was $2,500,000,000. The United States' share was $535,000,000. At the breaking out of the war now being waged France was paying something like $193,000,000 interest annually on a national debt of $6,286,435,000. Russia's burden was $4,507,071,000. The national debts—created largely or entirely by military expenditures—of other

countries were: Austria-Hungary, $3,612,389,000; Germany, $3,500,000,000; England, $3,389,577,000; Italy, $2,614,183,000; Spain, $1,886,221,000; Japan, $1,325,198,000; United States, $915,353,000. The interest on Europe's debts totalled more than $1,000,000,000 annually.

Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, estimates that the cost to England of one year of war will be $2,250,000,000. E. H. Gary, an American financier, figures that eighteen months of conflict will result in a property loss of $35,000,000,000 to the nations engaged.

Such vast sums, stated in cold type, are quite as much beyond human comprehension as the millions of miles distance to the stars, yet these figures represent but a fraction of the gross when the total includes loss of commerce, agricultural and manufacturing production, etc. And what an irreparable loss in arts, useful and

fine; education, culture and all the other things that combine to advance civilization.

But what are material and cultural losses to the broken hearts of millions of widowed women, orphaned children and bereft mothers!

What is, perhaps, the strongest count in the indictment against war is the disproportionate and permanent loss suffered by its helpless and innocent victims.

An authority estimates that the deaths due directly and indirectly to the present conflict will, in a year and a half, exceed 4,000,000.

If one traces war back to the dim beginning of history, among the high spots of death on the battlefield, or due to attendant causes in modern times, will be found a ghastly record of 14,000,000 during the nineteenth century, 6,000,000 in the Napoleonic Wars, while the appalling total in all wars to date is 15,000,000,000.

CHAPTER III

A Century of Peace Efforts

MODERN organized effort to prevent war dates back more than a century, being born of the twenty-six-year travail of the Napoleonic Wars into which the United States was drawn in 1812.

At the close of the Anglo-American struggle a peace society was formed in New York City, and from this beginning a number of similar organizations grew up throughout the country.

Later, international peace conferences were held in a number of European capitals. The more important of these early meetings were the ones convened as follows: London, 1843; Brussels, 1848; Paris, 1849; Frankfort, 1850; London, 1851. Subse-

quently, other congresses met in Paris, London, Rome, Berne, Chicago, Antwerp, Buda-Pesth, Hamburg, Paris, Glasgow, Monaco, Rouen, Boston, Lucerne, Milan and Munich.

These congresses, in great part, had shaped international public opinion to a degree that brought encouraging response to the "Rescript" issued by Nicholas II, Czar of Russia, in August, 1898. This document deplored the great increase in armaments with its attendant burden of taxation, and suggested that some move be made toward limiting their growth in the future. It also suggested that the governments of the world name delegates to a conference to discuss "this grave problem."

On January 11, 1899 (Russian Calendar, December 30, 1898), a circular was issued giving an outline of subjects to be considered by the conference, and on May 18,

1899, the first Hague Conference was convened.

So far as the stated purpose—to limit armaments—was concerned, the Conference can hardly be described as a success.

The most important result in the interest of peace was the organization of a Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The Second Hague Conference was held in 1907 and furthered the work begun in 1899.

The two Hague Conferences were without doubt the greatest steps taken in the promotion of international peace, and the importance of this means of settling international questions will be better appreciated when, at the close of the present disastrous war, the countries engaged will be forced by the international public opinion of neutral nations to resort to the Hague for the settlement of many of the disputed points resulting from the conflict.

CHAPTER IV

"Scraps of Paper"

THERE are many thoughtless, well-intentioned, or too-trustful souls who believe that peace can be preserved by the mere signing of treaties. But how, in the face of the absolute disregard of "scraps of paper" by practically all the nations now engaged in warfare, can any sane person accept such twaddle.

A rather general impression, due in great degree to the space devoted to the subject by publications of every character, is that the only treaties broken during the present war were those guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, but what of the violation of China's neutrality by the Allies? Again the Pekin to Mukden rail-

road was made neutral by treaty—has Japan respected this solemn pledge? These are recent instances of treaty breaking. They are typical of what has been done innumerable times. In short, since treaty-making began "scraps of paper" have been but frail barriers to the force of arms when "military necessity" has made the violation of the treaties imperative or desirable.

To get down to cold historical fact, the strength of a treaty has been and is only as great as the military power of the party desiring the keeping of the treaty to prevent others from breaking it; or a lack of desire when the other side is the stronger.

CHAPTER V

A Firm Foundation

THE Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 with the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration must ever stand as the foundation of future means of preventing war. However, the desired end will not be attained until rudimentary legislative machinery is developed into a real international law-making body, and limited judicial power is expanded into a Supreme Court of the World, with authority in international affairs analogous with the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States in the municipal affairs of this country.

To the legislative and judicial must be added police power to enforce the decisions and the mandates of the court.

In principle, these suggestions are not new. Until a few months ago they were thought too Utopian to command serious consideration, but if the war be continued for several years or, perhaps, but for a year, the nations of Europe will be reduced in great measure to the chaotic social and political condition of the tribes and races of the earth at the dawn of civilization, and as the primitive peoples found it necessary to begin to devise means to enforce respect for the rights of individuals, so the nations of the world will be receptive to suggestions looking to justice between nations.

A necessary preliminary to the practical application of the plan outlined would be the assembling of a commission to compile a digest of all rules that tacitly, tentatively or positively have been accepted by two or more countries as international law.

In the meantime steps would be taken

in the organization of an International Legislature to which the digest of existing international law would be presented.

The legislative body would then be charged with the task of making such additions and revisions as would be found necessary in developing a code of international law that would make theoretical international morality *positive* international morality.

Next in order would be the organization of the Supreme Court of the World. This tribunal could be composed of one judge from each of the signatory powers.

That the men comprising this judiciary should be of the highest type in character, ability and ripe experience goes without saying. But would they not be further raised above any charge or suspicion of partiality if, upon appointment, they automatically gave up citizenship in their respective countries and became, while in office,

citizens of a neutral state—the seat of the International Legislature and the Supreme Court of the World? Or could not these judges become "citizens of the world" by their adoption in common by all the Powers signatory to the treaty establishing the international law-making and judicial branches?

Another means of creating confidence in the impartiality of this Court would be to remove from the bench during trial the judges from the countries whose case was being tried. However, it would seem that this would be the least desirable of the plans suggested, as the viewpoints of the litigants would best be understood by judges from the countries involved.

The court procedure would be similar to that of a high municipal court.

Revenue to cover the expenses of the International Legislative and the Supreme Court of the World would be derived from

fines and taxation of the military establishments of the signatories. Any deficiency could be made up by retaining the necessary amount from interest on bonds held by the Court.

CHAPTER VI

Reserved Rights

WHILE it would be highly desirable to grant a Supreme Court of the World the widest jurisdiction, the Powers supporting this Tribunal should unquestionably be permitted to reserve to themselves certain clearly specified exceptions.

National honor should not be a judicial question. In other words, what is national honor in the case of a particular Power should not be a matter to be determined by any one except the Power itself. But, in order that the privilege of reservation should not be abused, each Power should file with the Court a statement, in detail, clearly defining what the Power considered national honor.

In cases involving national honor, the function of the Court should be limited to deciding whether the national honor of a country, as defined in the memoranda filed with the Court, had been violated.

Other reservations which, in the case of the United States, for instance, should be made would be matters of domestic affairs, immigration restriction, naturalization, land ownership by aliens, the Monroe Doctrine, the Lodge Resolution, etc.

It should be strictly optional with the country whose internal affairs were involved whether it would or not submit any given case to the Court.

A Power might in the interest of peace, while reserving to itself without prejudice all rights in the matter, submit to the Court cases involving internal matters, thereby openly presenting the question to the world.

If, in the opinion of the Court, a nation

had interfered or was attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of a State, the Court could hand down a decision against the aggressor and inflict on the culprit any punishment within the power of the Court.

Because of the privilege of reservation in internal affairs no decision could be made against the Power whose internal affairs were involved. However, the moral effect of failure on the part of a Power to prove its case against another would likely serve to prevent resort to arms in settlement of the question.

Apparently so many exceptions would leave loop-holes for the evasion of the jurisdiction of the proposed Court, but detailed examination of the causes of war will show that while reservations, such as these, have sometimes been used as the excuse for attack on nations making the reservations, such nations on their part

have not, as a rule, attacked others, though they have resorted to force of arms in defensive warfare to uphold what they considered measures of self-preservation.

CHAPTER VII

The Need of a Weapon

THAT some form of police power is essential to keeping peace throughout the world is sound doctrine, but that the police power should be in the form of an international military force—land, naval or both, except for strictly defensive purposes—is impracticable. This would mean war or threat of warfare. What is most desired is means of preventing conflict—in fine, a substitute for war.

Assuming that the causes of most wars are economic, any effectual substitute for war must inflict on the aggressor the most dire financial or other material effects of war; it should aim to accomplish the end desired in the shortest possible space of

time, and with certainty of result so obvious that the aggressor would see the end from the beginning, and be brought to a realization of ultimate and inevitable submission. Yet, there should be no permanent economic loss—no lives sacrificed, no property destroyed.

Here we may refer back to our stated premise that the civilized peoples of the earth desire peace, and we are assuming that all are willing to give concrete and tangible proof of the sincerity of this desire.

Further, it is assumed that should a peace compact be broken, that signatory nations would be willing to make temporary financial sacrifices to prevent, or, at least, limit the permanent economic loss that invariably results from armed conflict.

As evidence of good faith, each party to the peace pact could, in effect, give bond to keep the peace. This could be accomplished by each paying to the Court an

annual sum, based on the amount of the country's export business, for the purchase, by the Court, of government bonds of the signatory Powers; these bonds to be held by the Court in trust. The interest on the bonds, except the amount necessary to make up any deficiency in expenses as covered in a previous chapter, would be paid by the Court to the several countries, parties to the peace agreement.

As a determent to militarism each Power would pay to the Court a tax for each warcraft, each field gun, each man actively engaged in military duty, etc. In the case of the men there could be a graded tax—increasing somewhat on the principle of the Income Tax of the United States—with the difference of the basis being the number of men under arms in proportion to the population of a country.

So far we have dealt with the voluntary actions of Powers—the evidences of good

faith. We now take up the external means to prevent the breaking of the peace pact and the vindicatory measures to be applied to the culprit nation.

In case of a difference between two Powers, either could apply for an injunction which would be granted immediately by the Court. Refusal to obey an injunction would result in the infliction of the extreme powers of the Tribunal.

The case would as in usual judicial procedure come before the Court, and by due process a decision would be handed down specifying a time within which the mandate of the Court must be obeyed if the charges were sustained.

If the Court's orders were disobeyed, the disobedient Power would permanently lose all title to the bonds held in trust. A like effect would follow retaliatory measures or a declaration of war—formally or in effect—by the defendant.

The guilty nation should also be outlawed so far as having recourse to the Court, or enjoying any of the privileges or benefits of the peace pact.

If more drastic measures became necessary, the Court could declare the culprit Power AN ENEMY OF CIVILIZATION and the Powers signatory would act as directed by the Court.

Of course, the plaintiff would not be permitted to take the law into its own hands after a decision had been rendered against the defendant any more than would an individual—the plaintiff under civil law—take it upon himself to tear down a "spite fence" the building and maintaining of which had been declared illegal. Hostile offensive action initiated by the plaintiff would, at the discretion of the Court, make the offender liable to any or all of the penalties visited upon the defendant. But the plaintiff nation would reserve to

itself the right of self-defense in case of attack.

In further consideration of measures to force obedience to the orders of the Court, it hardly seems necessary to suggest that traffic in war munitions of any description between subjects of nations, parties to the peace pact, and a Power under the ban of the Court should be absolutely prohibited.

Reversing the universal practice as sanctioned by international law, each nation should be made responsible to the Court for the actions of the country's subjects, and the nation against which such war munitions were used should have recourse to the Court in a suit for damages based, let us say, on three or more times the value of such munitions.

As a matter of fact, there would be justice in a claim for the actual damage done by the implements of destruction, though

it would be difficult to prove that particular munitions did certain damage.

Notwithstanding that the purpose of this volume looks to the reduction of armaments and ultimate disarmament, the realization of the ideal is quite as impracticably idealistic, for the present, as would be the disarming of the police and other officers of the law or the abolishing of such forces.

However, the use of men and means should be strictly limited to defensive purposes by the Powers striving to bring an outlawed nation to terms, being always subject to the orders of the Supreme Court of the World on the high seas and everywhere else, except in defensive operations on a country's own soil or within the three-mile limit of coast lines.

CHAPTER VIII

The Weapon of Peace

WITH the commerce of all but the belligerent nation, under the protection of an international patrol of the ocean-trade routes, the Supreme Court of the World would next serve final notice on the culprit Power to obey the mandate of the Court. If no response came, or the reply were evasive, the Court would then unsheathe "The Weapon of Peace" and strike a death-dealing economic blow—to explain the figure of speech—declare an International BOYCOTT on all the exports and imports of the outlawed nation.

Not only would the Powers supporting the Court be forbidden to have commercia

or financial relations with the belligerent, but all other countries would be notified that cargoes consigned to or from ports under the ban would be considered contraband, and, therefore, subject to capture and prize court disposal.

An alternative method of preventing trade between the culprit nation and those not in the international agreement would be the boycotting of these latter nations for violation of the Court's order.

The holdings of the outlawed nation or of its subjects—real and personal property—could be seized as "enemy property" in all the countries in the international pact, and all income beyond taxes, carrying and other expenses, be paid to the Court during the continuance of hostilities.

Merchant ships of the outlawed nation could be interned subject to seizure on order of the Court.

No warcraft of the culprit nation should

A COINCIDENCE

UNDER date of January 10, 1915, there appeared in the Public Ledger, Philadelphia, an article said to have been the basis of a series of lectures which the late William T. Stead would have delivered in the United States had he not met an untimely fate in the Titanic disaster. To quote the publication: "this remarkable document has just come to light through the efforts of the Public Ledger."

By a strange coincidence Mr. Stead's ideas, in several essentials, are similar to those outlined in The Weapon of Peace, the manuscript of which was declined by a former editor of the Public Ledger, December 11, 1914 (one month before the publication of Mr. Stead's article) on the ground that the matter was "too academic."

During the month of December, 1914, the manuscript of The Weapon of Peace was submitted to the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, G. P. Putnam's Sons and George H. Doran Co., and was read by Mr. Leigh Mitchell Hodges, Henry G. Hodges, A. M., and others.

Excerpts from The Weapon of Peace were published as follows: Wilmington, (Del.) Morning News, December 2, 1914; The Star (Wilmington, Del.) December 13, 1914; Chester (Pa.) Times, December 19, 1914.

Mr. Stead's posthumous article—appearing in print for the first time some weeks after the completion of this volume—adds force to the suggestions offered in The Weapon of Peace.

SAMUEL WESLEY LONG.

January 11, 1915.

be permitted to enter a port of the countries enforcing the boycott. Should any such vessel attempt to demand supplies, it should be made subject to capture or destruction by the international patrol fleet.

Each nation enforcing the boycott should use warships—especially light, swift cruisers—to patrol its own coasts to prevent its nationals from smuggling goods out of the country to the boycotted nation or of smuggling into the country from the nation under the ban.

All these coercive measures could be further strengthened by a decree of the Court setting a date at which hostilities must cease under penalty of the period of the operation of the boycott being extended *after* the close of war a like number of days as the fighting continued after the date set by the Court to cease hostilities.

Were such a plan as the one outlined the potential "police power" back of a Su-

preme Court of the World, it would mean national economic hari-kari for a Power to defy the high Tribunal; and what country would be so foolhardy in these days of dollar diplomacy when, too often in the high places, conscience is carried in the purse?

CHAPTER IX

A Two-Edged Sword

HOW formidable an arm would be "The Weapon of Peace" will better be appreciated when we examine the other edge of this two-edged sword—the power of PUBLIC OPINION.

Answer to yourself the question: What is the motive back of the English "White Paper," the German "White Paper," the Russian "Orange Paper," the French "Yellow Book," the Belgian "Gray Book"?

To quote the words of the Hon. Theodore E. Burton: "In more than one European war of the last century one of the combatants has struggled under the serious handicap of the hostile international opinion that the war was not justifiable."

The Duke de Broglie puts it: "We live in a time when we must take as much and more account of the moral effect of a great measure than of its material and immediate results."

Writing at the Hague during the sessions of one of the conferences, Baroness von Suttner, author of "Lay Down Your Arms," said: "That which impresses me most is their respectful obedience to the desires of public opinion. If they oppose a reform, it is only because they are persuaded that public opinion is indifferent to it. If public opinion should express itself with appropriate vigor, there is nothing the Conference would not try to do. The fact is that the delegates are only the hands on a watch; their movements are governed by a great invisible spring. This spring is public opinion; not the private opinion of individuals, but *public* opinion—opinion expressed, organized, made pal-

pable and even disagreeable to those who oppose it. That is the master, and even the god, of the conference."

Such recognition of the force of public opinion is universal.

The natural consequence of an adverse decision of the Supreme Court of the World would be to turn international public opinion against the guilty country.

If it became necessary to outlaw the culprit Power by solemnly declaring it "an enemy of civilization," not only would it fail to find sympathy or support abroad, but within its own boundaries public opinion eventually would be crystallized against the government, when the masses realized the financial, commercial, political and social isolation that had resulted from the obstinacy or culpability of those in authority.

Bankers, manufacturers, merchants and workingmen would protest and bring to

bear such power as each class possessed to influence the government to submit to the order of the Court.

One might easily conceive of this internal dissatisfaction reaching the proportions and menace of rebellion. Instances of this character are not lacking, cases in point being the threat of a general strike in Austria as a protest against that country's suggested participation in the Balkan war; another case was the organized opposition of the French and German workingmen to war between their respective countries over the Moroccan controversy. Both in French and German cities workers carried banners bearing the inscription: "All Morocco is not worth the bones of one French or German working man."

Those who have gone below the surface in their investigations of conditions in the countries now in the grips of the world's greatest war are of the opinion that dis-

sension at home may yet be a factor in a principal party seeking means to end the titanic conflict in a manner that will save the face of those responsible for the nation's part in the war. The reason for this Power seeking peace would be comparable to the reason for not rushing into war or taking means to terminate conflict under pressure of the measures outlined in other chapters —briefly, the economic effects of isolation.

How many political heads have been lopped off by public opinion—that edge so blunt in other days and still dull in some parts of the world, but becoming steadily keener and keener the longer it remains in contact with the slow-moving grindstone of experience.

It is this cutting edge of public opinion wielded by the mighty arm of the ever-growing giant—Democracy—that will one day hack the throne from beneath the feet of every monarch—be his sceptre kingly or

the invisible one of perverted financial power.

When that day comes wars will be fought with economic forces, and the ancient pastime of kings, modernized by commercial monarchs, will not be played with human pawns.

CHAPTER X

Peace with Honor and Justice

UNDER such a plan as we have considered, peace could always be honorable, and the ideal of international justice be realized. For the nation whose cause had been decided to be just, there would be vindication. For the Power, whose position had been declared to be untenable, to bow to the will of the Court would show the nation to be a law-abiding member of the Federation of the World, and what could be more honorable?

Where the weak was in the right, it would mean peace with justice; where the strong's cause was just, it would mean justice with peace. Always would be left the middle ground of compromise.

Treaties would mean in fact what they purported to mean, and would be made to be kept under all circumstances; not to be broken as a matter of advantage or convenience.

Into his own would come the economist-statesman with world-vision, devoting his best efforts to universal economic justice. Then would become extinct the sort of "diplomat" whose greatest claim to distinction is his skill at intrigue and in his cunning.

Realizing the fact that means other and more effective than armed clashes would determine international questions *on their merits*, the cause of fear would be removed and the term "neighbor" would come to have a meaning, when applied to nations, as truly descriptive of the relationships of countries as in the case of individuals of a highly-civilized community.

While the application of the coercive

measures described would impose expense on all parties to the compact and possibly result in loss to all concerned, the total cost would be but temporary and fractional in comparison to the permanent and tremendous loss to the entire world resulting from warfare.

Indeed, an examination of the world's balance sheet at the end of a decade in which there had been recourse to ECONOMIC POLICE POWER or ECONOMIC WARFARE if you please, would show a credit over a similar period of *armed peace*, because of the hundreds of millions of saving effected by the degree of disarmament that could safely be undertaken.

But even assuming that the net financial cost of economic warfare would be as great a loss to those co-operating with the Supreme Court of the World against a culprit nation as that resulting from physical conflict, would not the broad view of uni-

versal and mutual responsibility, on the principle of one for all and all for one, dictate that the burden of the weak should be shared in part by the strong? And would there not be satisfaction in the thought that the war had been bloodless?

Deplore as we must the carnival of slaughter in which the majority of the world Powers are now engaged, might not great good result from so monstrous evil?

Let us hope, and let us use our utmost endeavors to have our hope realized, to the end that a phase of history repeat itself and—as at the close of the Napoleonic Wars there was born a desire for peace—so may be born again this holy ambition. And may peace come, even UNIVERSAL and EVERLASTING PEACE.

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